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B. The Broader Regulatory Framework-The EU Security Agenda and Transnational Crime Prevention
In April 2015, the European Commission presented the European Agenda on Security for the period of 2015-2020. 7 Highlighting that the primary goal of organized crime is profit and that international criminal networks use legal business structures to conceal the source of their profits, the European Agenda on Security called for a strengthening of the capacity of law enforcement to tackle the finance of organized crime. Besides the fight against organized crime and cybercrime, preventing terrorism and countering radicalization are identified as the most pressing challenges.
The European Agenda on Security will support Member States' cooperation in tackling these security threats. Key actions include effective measures to "follow the money" and cutting the financing of criminals, where cooperation between competent authorities will be strengthened, in particular the national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), which will be connected to Europol. In addition, Eurojust could offer more expertise and assistance to national authorities when conducting financial investigations. The idea is that cross-border cooperation between national FIUs and national Asset Recovery Offices (AROs) will help to 1 1 5 2 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 19 No. 05
combat money laundering and to access the illicit proceeds of crime. 8 The powers of FIUs will thereby be reinforced to better track the financial dealings of organized crime networks and to enhance the powers of competent national authorities to freeze and confiscate illicit assets. The European Agenda on Security thus aims at "tackling the nexus between terrorism and organized crime, highlighting that organized crime feeds terrorism through channels like the supply of weapons, financing through drug smuggling, and the infiltration of financial markets." 
12
Besides legislation against money laundering, the EU further contributes to preventing the financing of terrorism through the network of EU FIUs and the EU-US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme.
13
In February 2016, the Commission presented an Action Plan to further step up the fight against the financing of terrorism. 14 In brief, the plan has two main objectives. First, it aims to prevent the movement of funds and identify terrorist funding. In this respect, key actions include: Ensuring virtual currency exchange platforms are covered by the AML Directive; tackling terrorist financing through anonymous pre-paid instruments such as pre-paid cards; improving access to information and cooperation among EU FIUs; ensuring a high level of safeguards for financial flows from high risk third countries; and giving EU FIUs access to 8 Id. centralized bank and payment account registers and central data retrieval systems. Secondly, the plan aims to disrupt sources of revenue for terrorist organizations. Key actions include: Tackling terrorist financing sources-such as the illicit trade in goods, cultural goods, and wildlife, and working with third countries to ensure a global response to tackling terrorist financing sources.
15 Accordingly, the EU AML Regime is central also for the Action Plan for Strengthening the Fight Against Terrorist Financing. 16 Whereas the European Agenda on Security called for additional measures in the area of terrorist financing and money laundering, the Commission's Action Plan 17 highlighted the need to counter money laundering by means of criminal law and the need to ensure that criminals who fund terrorism are deprived of their assets. The next step is therefore to investigate how these regulatory challenges have been dealt with by the EU legislator.
C. A Two-Tier European Union Power to Regulate
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, TFEU has given particular attention to a number of cross-border crimes such as money laundering. Thus, money laundering is one of the so-called Euro-crimes with a specific criminal law legal basis in Article 83(1) TFEU. Despite the new criminal law competence to adopt EU criminal law measures directly based on Article 83(1) and the proposal for a first EU AML Criminal Law Directive, 18 the current AML framework mainly consists of two legal instruments, both based on Article 114 TFEU on the internal market: The fourth AML Directive, 19 soon to be amended by the recently adopted fifth AML Directive, 20 and the Transfer of Funds Regulation.
21
In order to avoid annulment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the predominant purpose of both instruments is ostensibly to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market, rather than to define criminal law 15 23 In this case, the Court stated that, admittedly, the now repealed third AML Directive 24 was founded on a dual legal basis, 25 and it also sought to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. The Court then went on to state that the Directive's main aim was the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. This was apparent both from its title and the preamble, and from the fact that it was adopted, like its predecessor, 26 in an international context in order to apply and make binding in the EU the recommendations of the FATF. In other words, both instruments now in force, update existing EU legal instruments on money laundering and the financing of terrorism and aim to implement and extend the newest FATF recommendations issued in February 2012, most recently updated in February 2018. 27 Yet, despite all assumptions and suggestions that the current EU AML framework is mainly administrative in character, there is a floating and vague line between administrative law and criminal law and sanctions, not least since national laws and EU law are intertwined and interrelated. cannot and may not require States to have certain criminal law provisions in place with certain specific minimum and maximum sanctions for breaches. 30 In other words, the internal market measures may not establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions within the scope of Article 83(1) TFEU. Under the present situation, the Member States should ensure that administrative sanctions and measures in accordance with the fourth AML Directive and criminal sanctions in accordance with national law are in place. If adopted, the AML criminal law directive will change this situation. 31 In this respect, the Commission claims that "All Member States criminalize money laundering but there are significant differences in the respective definitions of what constitutes money laundering, on which are the predicate offences-i.e. the underlying criminal activity which generated the property laundered-as well as the level of sanctions." 32 The Commission further argues that the current legislative framework is neither comprehensive nor sufficiently coherent to be fully effective, and that "The differences in legal frameworks can be exploited by criminals and terrorists, who can choose to carry out their financial transactions where they perceive anti-money laundering measures to be weakest." 33 The definitions, scope, and sanctions of money laundering offences affect cross-border police and judicial cooperation among national authorities and the exchange of information. Practitioners have reported that differences in criminal law pose obstacles to effective police co-operation and cross-border investigation. 34 According to the Commission, there are significant differences in the respective definitions of what constitutes money laundering, the predicate offences, and the level of sanctions. Such differences in the scope of predicate offences make it difficult for FIUs and law enforcement authorities in one Member State to coordinate with other EU jurisdictions to tackle cross-border money laundering. 31 At the time of writing in May 2018, the proposal has not been adopted. 32 AML Criminal Law Directive, supra note 9, at 1. 33 Id. 34 Id. at 2. 35 Id. at 1. This section builds upon and develops from Bergström 2018b, supra note 2.
Directive, and the imposition of criminal sanctions, in accordance with their national law, does not breach the principle of ne bis in idem. In other words, it is the responsibility of the Member States to ensure that the parallel systems of administrative and criminal law sanctions do not breach the principle of ne bis in idem. 36 Third, the fourth AML Directive further emphasizes that sanctions or measures for breaches of national provisions transposing the Directive must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. 37 As pointed out by Koen Lenaerts and José Gutiérrez-Fons, 38 the CJEU in Åkerberg Fransson recalled that, when EU legislation does not specifically provide any penalty for an infringement of EU law or refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, the Member States have the freedom to choose the applicable penalties, i.e., administrative, criminal or a combination of the two. 39 Yet, the resulting penalties must comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) and be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. 40 Any measure based on Article 83(1) TFEU, however, will leave no such freedom to the Member States.
I. The Criminal Law Proposal
On December 21, 2016, two days after the compromise proposal aiming at amending the fourth AML Directive was adopted by the Council, 41 40 See id., para. 36. 41 On December 21, 2016, the Commission submitted two legislative proposals: The proposal for the Criminal Law AML Directive, COM (2016) 826 final (AML Criminal Directive, supra note 9), and a proposal for a Regulation on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders.
Directive. This was the first proposal based on Article 83(1) TFEU, 42 which identifies money laundering as one of the so called "Euro-crimes" with a particular cross-border dimension.
The proposal aims to counter money laundering by means of criminal law and enables the European Parliament and the Council to establish the necessary minimum rules on the definition of money laundering by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. The proposal would complement different pieces of EU legislation that require Member States to criminalize some forms of money laundering. It will partially replace Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA as regards the Member States bound by this proposal. 43 According to the Commission proposal, the existing instruments at the EU level-and in particular the above-mentioned Framework Decisionare limited in scope and do not ensure a comprehensive criminalization of money laundering offences.
44
The proposal further complements Directive 2014/42/EU that aims at creating a common set of minimum rules for the detection, tracing, and confiscation of proceeds of crime across the EU, and Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA, which criminalizes the participation in an organized criminal group and racketeering. 45 In addition, it reinforces and complements the criminal law framework with regard to offences relating to terrorist groups, in particular the Directive on Combating Terrorism, 46 which sets a "comprehensive definition of the crime of terrorist financing, covering not only terrorist offences, but also terrorist-related offences such as recruitment, training and propaganda." 47 As stated in the Explanatory Memorandum of the criminal law proposal, the rationale behind the proposal was that terrorists often resort to criminal proceeds to fund their activities and use money laundering schemes in that process. Thus, the underlying idea is that criminalization of money laundering would contribute to tackling terrorist financing. The consolidated compromise text of the proposed Directive, as resulting from these discussions and confirmed at COREPER on May 24, 2017, seeks to reflect the compromises achieved on the basis of the positions expressed by delegations. 53 On the one hand, if the latest proposal for an AML Criminal Law Directive is adopted, it would expand the current EU focus from prevention to the control of money laundering and terrorist financing. On the other hand, as suggested by the Commission, the proposal, if adopted, will also reinforce the measures in place aimed at detecting, disrupting, and preventing the abuse of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes, notably the fourth AML Directive. This Directive, along with the Transfer of Funds Regulation, 54 sets out rules which are designed to prevent the abuse of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. 53 
Id.
54 Regulation (EU)2015/847, supra note 10. 55 See also Bergström 2018b, supra note 2; Bergström 2018a, supra note 2.
II. The EU Administrative Law Directives

Compensatory Measures and the Risk-based Approach
The EU AML Directive from 1991-the first AML Directive-was the first stage in combating money laundering at the European level. 56 The preamble of the first AML Directive stated that money laundering must be combated mainly by penal means and within the framework of international cooperation among judicial and law enforcement authorities. Yet, the directive recognized that a penal approach should not be the only way to combat money laundering "since the financial system can play a highly effective role." 57 The preamble further stated that money laundering has an evident influence on the rise of organized crime in general and drug trafficking in particular. It continued on to say that there is increasing awareness that combating money laundering is one of the most effective means of opposing this form of criminal activity, which constitutes a particular threat to the Member States' societies.
The shift towards the risk-based approach and the extension to include the financing of terrorism 58 as money laundering predicate offence were both introduced with the third AML Directive at the European level. 59 Even today these remain two of the major changes within this regulatory field. This shift brought the regional EU rules in line with the global standard, revised and expanded FATF recommendations. 60 First, each country should criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts, and terrorist organizations, and ensure that such offences are designated as money laundering predicate offences.
61 FATF also agreed upon rules about freezing and confiscating terrorist assets, 62 rules about reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism, 63 and rules concerning international co-operation, alternative remittance, wire transfers, and non-profit 56 First AML Directive, supra note 26. 57 Id., n.18. 58 Third AML Directive, supra note 24, recital 8. 59 Id. (Oct. 2004) . 61 Id., Special Recommendation II. 62 Id., Special Recommendation III. 63 Id., Special Recommendation IV.
FATF, FATF 40 Recommendations
organizations. 64 On 22 October 2004, a ninth special recommendation on cash couriers was developed with the objective of ensuring that terrorists and other criminals cannot finance their activities or launder the proceeds of their crimes through the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments. 65 Second, the "risk-based approach" 66 was given a prominent position in the third AML directive, as well as in the amended FATF recommendations upon which it builds. 67 The starting point is that risks differ among countries, customers, and business areas over time. The operators themselves are the best analysts of where the risk areas are, or might arise, as they know best their businesses and their customers. The idea is that resources should be used where needs arise and the framework is supposed to be more flexible and adjustable to risk. Within a risk-based approach, businesses are expected to make risk assessments of their customers and divide them into low and high-risk categories. In order to enable operators to assess whether a situation involves a risk of money laundering and terrorist financing and to act accordingly, the directive introduced more detailed provisions. For this purpose, the directive specified a number of customer due diligence (CDD) measures that are more extensive and far-reaching for situations of higher risk, such as appropriate procedures to determine whether a person is a politically exposed person (PEP). The riskbased approach further emphasizes that the evaluation of who is high or low risk is to be a continuous process. As a result, the concept of "know your customer," as used in the financial sector, in practice became applicable to all covered by the directive. 68 
Towards a More Targeted and Focused Risk-Based Approach
The current AML framework consists of two legal instruments both based on Article 114 TFEU on the internal market: The fourth AML Directive 69 and the Transfer of Funds Regulation. 70 Both instruments update existing EU legal instruments on money laundering and the financing of terrorism and aim to implement and extend the newest recommendations issued in February 2012 by the FATF. 71 The fourth AML Directive aims to prevent the Union's financial system from abuse for purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. 72 The risk-based approach 73 has been further developed towards a more targeted and focused risk-based approach using evidence-based decision-making, as well as guidance by European supervisory authorities.
74
In this respect, the new framework clarifies how AML supervisory powers apply in cross-border situations. These changes have the aim of updating the EU rules to implement the newest FATF recommendations, with their increased focus on the effectiveness of regimes to counter money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as addressing the shortcomings of the third AML Directive identified by the European Commission. 72 Fourth AML Directive, supra note 5, art. 1(1). 73 See, e.g., Herlin-Karnell, supra note 67; Bergström, supra note 2; Bergström, 2016, supra note 6, n. 27. 74 Fourth AML Directive, supra note 5. Recital 23, for example, states that underpinning the risk-based approach is the need for member states and the Union to identify, understand, and mitigate the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing that they face. The importance of a supranational approach to risk identification has been recognized at the international level, and the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), According to the Council, the Directive's strengthened rules "reflect the need for the EU to adapt its legislation to take account of the development of technology and other means at the disposal of criminals." 76 In general, the Directive's scope is extended by reducing the cash payment threshold that triggers reporting obligations from EUR 15,000 to EUR 10,000, by including providers of gambling services within its scope, and by including tax crimes as new predicate offenses. The new framework reinforces the sanctioning powers of the competent authorities, 77 and the Directive stipulates a maximum administrative pecuniary sanction of up to twice the amount of the benefit derived from the breach where such benefit can be determined, or up to EUR 1 million. 78 In addition, the fourth AML Directive incorporates new provisions on data protection. Besides these general changes, a few specific issues are worth mentioning.
First, risk-assessments are required at several different levels. At the EU level the Commission is obliged-at least biennially-to assess the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities. 79 The Member States in turn, shall assess the risks affecting them, including any data protection concerns. 80 Member States shall also ensure that obliged entities make risk assessments relating to their customers, countries or geographic areas, products, services, transactions, or delivery channels, all proportionate to the nature and size of the obliged entities. 81 Second, there are tougher rules on customer due diligence (CDD), which require that banks and other relevant entities have in place adequate controls and procedures so that they know their customers and understand the nature of their customers' businesses. To the benefit of those involved, these rules have been clarified. As under the previous Directives, relevant entities can take simplified measures where risks are demonstrated to be lower, 82 but are required to take enhanced measures where the risks are greater, 83 including specific provisions on politically exposed persons (PEPs) at domestic level, and PEPs working for international organizations. 84 The new Directive, however, will prescribe minimum factors to be taken into account before applying simplified measures, and obliged entities need to prove why they have considered the risk to be low.
Third, in order to enhance transparency, specific provisions on the beneficial ownership of companies have been introduced. Information about beneficial ownership will be stored in a central register accessible to competent authorities, FIUs, entities required to take CDD measures, and other persons with a legitimate interest.
85 Such access to information needs to be in accordance with data protection rules and may be subject to online registration and the payment of a fee, not exceeding the administrative costs of obtaining the information.
86
This section will be replaced by the fifth AML Directive, and in the future, Member States may, under conditions to be determined in national law, provide for access to additional information enabling the identification of the beneficial owner. That additional information shall include at least the date of birth or contact details in accordance with data protection rules. According to recital 14, access to accurate and up-to-date information on the beneficial owner is a key factor in tracing criminals who might otherwise hide their identity behind a corporate structure. In addition, new rules on traceability of fund transfers have been introduced. Fourth, with the introduction of the fourth AML Directive, there will be more cooperation between national authorities. Of central importance, the role of national FIUs is to receive, analyze the exchange, and disseminate reports raising suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing to competent authorities in order to facilitate their cooperation. 87 In this respect, the FIUs have been given strengthened powers to identify and follow suspicious transfers of money and facilitate exchange of information.
88 They now have the access to financial, administrative, and law enforcement information and are empowered to take early action if requested from the law enforcement authorities. According to recital 58, Member States should in particular ensure that their FIUs exchange information freely, 84 Id. art. 20-23 (with a new article 20a inserted by the fifth AML Directive). 85 Id., art. 30 (will be amended by the fifth AML Directive). 86 Id., art. 30(5) para. 2 (will be amended by the fifth AML Directive). 87 Id., art. 32(3) (not amended by the fifth AML Directive). spontaneously or upon request, with third-country FIUs, having regard to Union law and to the principles relating to information exchange developed by the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. 89 Despite the internal market legal basis, the wider regulatory framework can therefore be said to have changed from a predominantly single market context via criminal law concerns to the fight against organized crime, terrorist financing, and an internal security context based on the risk-based approach. The main focus of the global and regional EU measures based on the risk-based approach is, however, still set on preventive measures, whereas AML control is still a matter for national jurisdictions and the developing framework of international cooperation among judicial and law enforcement authorities. It remains to be seen if the proposal for an AML Criminal Law Directive will be adopted that would expand the current EU focus from prevention to control of money laundering and terrorist financing. Meanwhile, Member States are obliged to implement the fourth AML Directive, 90 to which changes have already been adopted by the text of the fifth AML Directive signed on May 30, 2018. It will enter into force twenty days after its publication in the Official Journal (Article 5), and the Member States need to implement its provision eighteen months thereafter (Article 4). 
Implementing the Action Plan for Strengthening the Fight Against Terrorist Financing
About two years earlier, on July 5, 2016, the European Commission adopted the proposal to amend the fourth AML Directive and Directive 2009/101. The latter established the European Central Platform interconnecting Member States' central registers holding beneficial ownership information. 92 The idea behind the amendments was to reinforce the preventive framework against money laundering, 93 in particular by addressing emerging risks and increasing the capacity of competent authorities to access and exchange information. 94 These amendments aim at ensuring a high level of safeguards for financial flows from high-risk third countries, enhancing the access of FIUs to information, including centralized bank account registers, and tackling terrorist financing risks linked to virtual currencies and pre-paid cards. In this respect, this recently adopted fifth AML Directive takes a stricter approach to the problem of effectively countering money laundering and terrorist financing and focuses on new channels and modalities of transferring illegal funds to the legal economy, such as virtual currencies and money exchange platforms.
The proposal was a coordinated action with the G20 and the OECD, aiming at tackling tax evasion by both legal and natural persons in order to establish a fairer and more effective tax system. In this respect, it formed part of a wider EU effort to improve tax transparency and tackle tax abuse. 95 About five months after the Commission proposal, on December 19, 2016, the Council adopted a compromise text on the proposal aiming at amending the AML Directive, Directives 2009/138/EC (Solvency II), 96 and 2013/36/EU, but not Directive 2009/101, focusing mainly on AML and terrorist financing. 97 Although the purpose of fighting tax evasion is no longer explicitly mentioned, tools that were designed to achieve that purpose remain, although somewhat modified. 98 Set in a broader picture, this initiative was the first proposal to enforce the Action Plan for Strengthening the Fight Against Terrorist Financing, 99 which was adopted by the Commission on February 2, 2016 to better counter 1 1 6 6 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 19 No. 05 the financing of terrorism, and to ensure increased transparency of financial transactions following the so-called "Panama Papers" revelations. 100 Nevertheless, the proposed amendments have been criticized by the Data Protection Agency for introducing other policy purposes than countering money laundering and terrorist financing that do not seem clearly identified: Processing personal data collected for one purpose for another, completely unrelated purpose. This infringes on the data protection principle of purpose limitation and threatens the implementation of the principle of proportionality. The amendments, in particular, raise questions as to why certain forms of invasive personal data processing, acceptable in relation to AML and the fight against terrorism, are necessary out of those contexts and whether these invasive data processing are proportionate. 101 The Data Protection Agency also criticizes the proposed amendments due to the lack of proportionality, in particular concerning the broadened access to beneficial ownership information by both competent authorities and the public as a policy tool to facilitate and optimize enforcement of tax obligations. The Data Protection Agency sees, "in the way such solution is implemented, a lack of proportionality, with significant and unnecessary risks for the individual rights to privacy and data protection."
Despite all assumptions and suggestions that the current EU AML framework is mainly administrative in character, there is not a clear line between administrative and criminal law and sanctions, not least since national laws and EU law are intertwined and interrelated. This may have detrimental effects concerning procedural safeguards and fundamental rights protection-for example if sanctions are in fact criminal rather than administrative in character, or if the different solutions chosen in different Member States, lead to variations in fundamental rights protection throughout the European Union.
So far, it is mainly the responsibility of the Member States to ensure that the parallel systems of administrative and criminal law sanctions do not breach fundamental rights including the principle of ne bis in idem, the rules on privacy and data protection, and the principle of proportionality. EU Law measures may, however, by themselves infringe fundamental rights. Processing personal data collected for one purpose for another, completely unrelated purpose infringes on the data protection principle of purpose limitation and threatens the implementation of the principle of proportionality. The Data Protection Supervisor-in particular concerning the proposed amendments to the fourth AML Directive-raised questions as to why certain forms of invasive personal data processing, acceptable in relation to AML and the fight against terrorism, are necessary out of these contexts and whether they are proportionate. Such issues need to be evaluated against national human rights catalogues, the European Convention of Human Rights, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This is even more important when dealing with criminal, rather than purely administrative, law provisions and sanctions, which might necessitate further legal analysis.
